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This study examines the implementation in Greece of a type of poll tax, namely the ‘trad ing duty’. In the past, the poll tax was
chiefly a fixed tax charge applied to an individual, irrespective of the latter’s income, property and consumer expenditure.
Similarly, the ‘trading duty’ is a fixed tax levy which runs contrary to modern perceptions of society as a whole regard ing
proportional and progressive taxation. Nowadays, a fair d istribution of the tax burden must be characterized by both horizontal
and vertical tax equality. The princ ip les of universality of taxation, taxation equality, justice and certainty and the princ ip le that
no tax measures should be retroactive are embodied in the Greek Constitution.
In Greece, the last three years have seen the approval of numerous tax laws, non-tax laws containing artic les on tax provis ions
and Ministry of Finance decisions and decrees, while, in 2012, for the first time after many decades, all sectors of the economy
are ‘in the red’. Despite the gloomy financ ial environment in Greece, in fiscal year 2012 a type of poll tax was imposed as a
‘trading duty’ for traders who filed Natural Person Income Tax (NPIT) returns.
The implementation of the ‘trading duty’ allows for an extension from the terms ‘Operating Leverage’ (OL) and ‘Financial
Leverage’ (FL) to the term ‘Tax Leverage’ (TL). Thus, when a percentage change in Earnings Before Tax (EBT) trans lates into
growth of Earnings After Tax (EAT), then the phenomenon of the magnifying effect may be called Tax Leverage (TL) and it will
be due to the possible constancy of the tax burden (e.g. trading duty, poll tax).
In this study, through a detailed example, financ ial results (Degrees of Operating, Financial and Tax Leverage) determined at
different levels of sales volume exhib it similar financial characteristics. Statistically they show linearity and a strong correlation,
which create reasonable grounds for introducing a new terminology in Finance. We consider it a given that OL is determined to a
large extent by technology and can increase or decrease as a result of decisions relating to the investment budget. Furthermore,
FL is positively related to the profitab ility of Assets, when EBIT/Assets>Borrowing Costs. Then, on the basis of the data and
limitations of this study, TL is positively related to the profitab ility of Assets, when EBT/Assets>Tax Costs, while the Degree of
Tax Leverage and the size of EAT are directly related accordingly.
Lastly, a specific degree of combined leverage can be achieved through a different mix of OL, FL and TL, in order to offset any
negative results that may arise from one of the three.
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trading duty; fair distribution of the tax burden; determination of financial results.
Looking at the different types of taxes over the centuries, it can be seen that the poll tax was chiefly a fixed tax
charge applied to an individual, irrespective of the latter’s income, property and consumer expenditure.
In Mosaic law, a poll tax was imposed which was payable by every man above the age of 20, so that the rich
would not pay more and the poor would not pay less.
The ancient Romans imposed a poll tax on the peoples of the Roman provinces, while the attempt of the
Byzantine emperor Leo III the Isaurian to levy a poll tax in the Italian provinces was one of the primary reasons for
Italy’s separation from the Byzantine Empire. Moreover, the attempt of King Aistulf of the Lombards to introduce a
poll tax on every Roman citizen prompted Pope Stephen II to turn to the Franks for assistance, which later led to the
establishment of the Papal States.
In France, a poll tax was first imposed by King Louis XIV to finance military campaigns. This tax was repealed
with the French Revolution, only to be replaced by a new one that remained in force until the late 19th century, the
size of which differed according to location.
In the United States, the payment of a poll tax was a prerequisite for the right to vote. It was widely used in the
South along with other measures as an indirect means of disfranchising the poor, blacks in particular. In 1966, the
Supreme Court abolished all poll taxes.
In New Zealand, a poll tax was imposed on Chinese immigrants during the 19th and early 20th centuries, for
which the country’s prime minister made an official apology in 2002.
During the 14th century in England, the imposition of a poll tax on every person over the age of 15 was one of the
causes of the Peasants’ Revolt in 1381. In the 17th century, the tax was generally associated with military
emergencies and was abolished after 1698. More recently, in 1989, a new poll tax was imposed for the purpose of
financing local government. It was a fixed tax per adult resident, with provision for discounts for lower-income
earners. The new tax appeared to shift the tax burden from rich to poor, since it was based on the number of people
living in a house as opposed to the estimated value of the house. Moreover, higher than anticipated tax rates set by
local councils and significant differences between boroughs fuelled even greater resentment, which increased the
cost of collecting the tax and reduced the expected revenue. Unrest culminated in mass protests which played a part
in toppling the prime minister in 1990 and the poll tax was replaced by a council tax levied on the capital value of a
property.
Nowadays, a fair distribution of the tax burden must be characterized by both horizontal and vertical tax equality,
which pose the questions: a) when is tax treatment the same and when are circumstances the same? and b) how great
a differentiation should there be between different circumstances and how great between different tax treatments?
The need thus arises for the selection of criteria for the fair distribution of tax between proportional and
progressive taxation. The proportionality of the ‘benefit’ theory does not as a rule apply for the poorer classes in the
case of matters of vital importance, such as the provision of healthcare services, although it can be socially
acceptable with regard to issues of secondary importance such as tolls or gasoline tax.
In contrast, the progressiveness of the ‘ability-to-pay’ theory leads to a redistribution of income from the higher
to the lower income classes and is in line with modern-day perceptions of society as a whole concerning social
justice. The principles underlying the exercise of tax policy which have been put forward since the 18th century
(Justi, Kames, Mill) have been incorporated over time, suitably adapted, in the Greek Constitution, which stipulates
that all Greek citizens without distinction are required to contribute to public expenditures, in correspondence with
their means. More specifically, the principles of universality of taxation and taxation equality is embodied in article
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4 (par. 5), while article 78 enshrines not only the principle of the justice and certainty of taxation (par. 1) but also the
principle that no tax measures should be retroactive (par. 2).
Despite this, the Greek parliament recently passed Law 3986/2011, article 31 of which provides for the
imposition of a ‘trading duty’ (poll tax), with paragraphs 1 and 6 stipulating:
1. Traders and self-employed professionals who keep category B or C books pursuant to the Tax Code of
Account Books and Records shall be required to pay an annual trading duty, which is set as follows:
a. For enterprises or self-employed professionals having their registered office in tourist areas and in towns or
villages with a population of up to two hundred thousand (200,000), the amount of four hundred (400) euros
annually.
b. For enterprises or self-employed professionals having their registered office in towns or cities with a
population of over two hundred thousand (200,000), the amount of five hundred (500) euros annually.
.......................................
6. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be applicable to traders and self-employed professionals who
are practising a trade or profession, respectively, on 1.1.2011 and after.
The function of taxes as a means of exercising economic and social policy (e.g. investments, income
redistribution) is expressed in a country’s tax policy, which is not always consistent with accounting standardization.
The latter is achieved either through the recommendations of scientific and professional organizations without the
direct involvement or intervention of the state (e.g. UK, USA, Canada), or with the legislative intervention of the
state (e.g. Germany, France, Greece). In the former case, checks to verify implementation of the standardization are
undertaken by external (certified) auditors and the tax authorities or stock exchange control committees exercise the
state’s supervisory role. Correspondingly, in the latter case, for historical, social and economic policy reasons,
scientific and professional accounting organizations cannot enact matters relating to accounting standardization
without the legislative intervention of the state.
Accounting treatment also includes tax provisions, the implementation of which may yield a different result. This
appears in tax returns, whereas financial statements must mandatorily be prepared on the basis of accounting
standards. In Greece, however, a number of problems still exist and basic principles of accounting are distorted due
to conflicting provisions of commercial and tax law, the non-uniform treatment of ‘accounting differences’ and
piecemeal decisions drafted by senior public administrators.
The last 2½ years have seen the approval of six (6) tax laws, eighteen (18) non-tax laws containing articles on tax
provisions, sixty-five (65) Ministry of Finance decisions (MFD) and seventy-three (73) Ministry of Finance decrees.
It is worth noting that 45 MFDs were issued of the 67 provided in Law 3842/2010 which, along with Law
3943/2011 were not implemented in practice since they were subsequently overturned, amended or replaced by new
provisions.
At the same time, in the economic environment prevailing in Greece, 2012 appears to be even more difficult than
previous years, since for the first time, after many decades, all sectors of the economy are ‘in the red’. In 2011 the
decline in sales, revenue and profits marked a new record as a result of the more general recession and lack of
liquidity but also due to the tax policy being implemented.
The balance sheets of joint stock companies (corporations) listed on the stock exchange for 2011 show losses of
almost 40 billion euros. For 2010, an examination of the balance sheets of 32,500 enterprises, i.e. nearly all
companies with limited liability in the country, revealed that sales were down 5.35%, while they had also fallen by
approximately 13% the previous year. The decline in sales and gross profits in combination with the increase in
expenditures led to losses totaling 6.6 billion euros, compared to earnings before tax of 3.6 billion euros in the
previous financial year. However, the after-tax financial results presented an even more disappointing picture: of the
24 branches of manufacturing, the results of only two improved (reduction of losses or increase of profits), while
those of 22 deteriorated.
Despite the above-described gloomy financial environment in Greece, in fiscal year 2012 a type of poll tax was
imposed as a ‘trading duty’ for traders who filed Natural Person Income Tax (NPIT) returns. The processing of
NPIT returns for fiscal year 2012 by the Finance Ministry shows in Table 1 the only available data pertaining to the
3. Accounting, tax and economic environment in Greece
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persons liable and the amounts assessed for the ‘trading duty’. It should be clarified that the Legal Person Income
Tax returns for fiscal year 2012 correspond to 247,180 liable persons and the amounts assessed are not related to the
‘trading duty’.
Table 1: Trading duty for natural persons, fiscal year 2012
Description Number Amount
Trading duty for liable persons with sole proprietorship 316.961 145.917.859,02
Trading duty for spouses with sole proprietorship 82.660 37.126.416,85
Trading duty for liable persons with a profession (self-employed) 109.154 50.421.549,37
Trading duty for spouses with a profession (self-employed) 32.899 14.995.791,53
Trading duty for liable persons with sole proprietorship and profession 6.051 3.085.549,94
Trading duty for spouses with sole proprietorship and profession 951 497.250,01
Trading duty for liable persons (not included in the above) 2.755 1.141.149,97
Trading duty for spouses (not included in the above) 841 350.024,98
Trading duty for liable persons (other cases) 71.558 30.465.416,94
Trading duty for spouses (other cases) 17.849 7.549.575,12
Trading duty for liable persons 506.479 231.031.525,24
Trading duty for spouses 135.200 60.519.058,49
In economic science, when a percentage change in sales volume results in the growth of EBIT, the phenomenon
of this magnifying effect is known as Operating Leverage (OL) and it is due to the constancy of Operating
Expenses. Similarly, when a percentage change in EBIT results in the growth of EBT, then the phenomenon of this
magnifying effect is known as Financial Leverage (FL) and it is due to the constancy of Financing Expenses.
Following the implementation of Law 3986/2011 (article 31) and the collection of the ‘trading duty’ for fiscal
year 2012 (Table 1), the aforementioned leverage terms may be extended.
Thus, when a percentage change in EBT translates into growth of EAT, then the phenomenon of the magnifying
effect may be called and it will be due to the possible constancy of the tax burden (e.g. trading
duty, poll tax).
According to the above, it is possible to determine how many times there is a change in additional EBIT for each
change in sales volume (Degree of Operating Leverage), how many times there is a change in addition EBT for each
change in EBIT (Degree of Financial Leverage) and, in view of the aforesaid extension of the relevant terms, how
many times there is a change in additional EAT for each change in EBT .
Table 2 shows the non-accounting determination of financial results at five (5) different levels of sales volume.
To facilitate calculations, we assume that the sale price and the sale cost of each unit (u) is €1 and €0.7 respectively,
the operating expenses are €50, the financing expenses €100 and the poll tax €80.
Aggregated
4. Operating, f inancing and tax leverage
Tax Leverage (TL )
(Degree of Tax Leverage)
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VOLUME x2 VOLUME x3 VOLUME x4 VOLUME x5
Sales (1.000 u x 1 €) (2.000 u x 1 €) (3.000 u x 1 €) (4.000 u x 1 €) (5.000 u x 1 €)
- Sales cost (1.000 u x 0,7 €) (2.000 u x 0,7 €) (3.000 u x 0,7 €) (4.000 u x 0,7 €) (5.000 u x 0,7 €)
Gross earnings 300 600 900 1.200 1.500
- Fixed Operating
Expenses
50 50 50 50 50
Earnings Before Interest
& Tax
250 (EBIT) 550: 250 = 2,20 850: 250 = 3,40 1.150: 250 = 4,60 1.450: 250 = 5,80
- Fixed Financing
Expenses
100 100 100 100 100
Earnings Before Tax 150 (EBT) 450: 150 = 3,00 750: 150 = 5,00 1.050: 150 = 7,00 1.350: 150 = 9,00
- Tax (poll tax) 80 80 80 80 80
Earnings After Tax 70 (EAT) 370: 70 = 5,29 670: 70 = 9,57 970: 70 = 13,86 1.270: 70 = 18,14
Degree of Operating Leverage 2,20/2,00 = 1,10 3,40/3,00 = 1,13 4,60/4,00 = 1,15 5,80/5,00 = 1,16
Degree of Financial Leverage 3,00/2,20 = 1,36 5,00/3,40 = 1,47 7,00/4,60 = 1,52 9,00/5,80 = 1,55
Degree of Tax Leverage 5,29/3,00 = 1,76 9,57/5,00 = 1,91 13,86/7,00 = 1,98 18,14/9,00 = 2,02
Then, for the different sales volumes of 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 and 5,000 units, the Degree of Tax Leverage will be
1.76, 1.91, 1.98 and 2.02 times respectively, which means that for each change in EBT of, for example, 10%, EAT
will grow by 17.60%, 19.10%, 19.80% and 20.20% depending on sales level. For the needs of the specific example,
we calculate a fixed amount of tax, with the assumption that there is no tax on profits, for instance. However, this is
an assumption that in the real economy approximates actual circumstances for sole proprietorships in recent years,
the financial results of which have deteriorated more than those of the corporations referred to in the third section.
It can be seen from Table 2 of section 4 that EAT increase at each level of sales by a fixed amount (4.28), as do
EBIT (1.20) and EBT (2.00). Moreover, at the successively higher sales levels, TL shows a decelerating increase
(1.76, 1.91. 1.98, 2.02), as too do OL (1.10, 1.13, 1.15, 1.16) and FL (1.36, 1.47, 1.52, 1.55). In addition, the Degree
of TL continues the accelerating increase which begins from the Degree of OL and is transferred to the Degree of
FL for each sales level:
2000 units (1.10, 1.36, 1,76),
3000 units (1.13, 1.47, 1.91),
4000 units (1.15, 1.52, 1.98) and
5000 units (1.16, 1.55, 2.02).
The statistical analysis of the data was carried out with the SPSS 17 package. To test the relationship between
Operational, Financial and Tax Leverage, linear regression analysis was used along with Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient (rho), instead of the usual alternative of Pearson’s coefficient, because the sample is small
and the required normality test is not feasible. The table below shows the correlation coefficients with the
corresponding p-values:
5. Statistical test and results
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Table 3: Correlation of DOL, DFL, DTL and p-values
Correlations DOL DFL DTL
Degree of Operating Leverage
Spearman’s rho 1 ,996** ,997**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,004 ,003
Degree of Financial Leverage
Spearman’s rho 1** 1 1,000**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000
Degree of Tax Leverage
Spearman’s rho ,997** ,996** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,003 ,004
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 3 reveals the very strong correlation (rho>0.95, p<0.001) between Tax Leverage and the other two types of
leverage.
In addition, the linear regression of Tax Leverage (dependent variable) was examined separately with each of the
other two types of leverage. The reason why multiple linear regression was not examined is that, as can be seen from
the correlation coefficients, there is collinearity between financial and operating leverage which results in one of the
two falling out of the regression.
Table 4 presents data from both linear models, along with the B coefficients, p-values for the dependent
variables, the F-criterion values of the analysis of variance and the p-value for the analysis of variance:
Table 4: Linear Model Data
Model B coefficient p- value
ANOVA
F P-value
Model 1 - Independent
Variable : OL
4,310 0,003 284,878 0,003
Model 2 - Independent
Variable : FM
1,371 0,001 65665,800 0,000
The above results give rise to a second consideration pertaining to the existence of a direct relationship between
Tax Leverage and the other two types of leverage. In this study, the collinearity and the strong correlation of its
variables create reasonable grounds for introducing a new terminology in Finance. We consider it a given that OL is
determined to a large extent by technology and can increase or decrease as a result of decisions relating to the
investment budget. Furthermore, FL is positively related to the profitability of Assets, when
EBIT/Assets>Borrowing Costs. Then, on the basis of the data and limitations of this study, TL is positively related
to the profitability of Assets, when EBT/Assets>Tax Costs. The aforementioned limitations concern the non-
calculation of other taxes, such as income tax, ‘solidarity’ tax, etc. Even the size of the poll tax is influenced by the
type of economic activity of natural persons (sole proprietorship or self-employed professional), while the Degree of
Tax Leverage and the size of EAT are directly related accordingly.
Lastly, Figure 1 presents the three degrees of leverage in correlation with the sales volume, and the similarity is
quite clear in the shape of the curves for DTL, DFL AND DOL and, consequently, in their behavior:
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Figure 1: Degree of leverage and sales volume
Hence, we may calculate Total Leverage as: OL * FL * TL. Then, a specific degree of combined leverage can be
achieved through a different mix of OL, FL and TL, in order to offset any negative results that may arise from one
of the three.
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